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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF CONTRIBUTIONS
UNDER THE INCOME-TAX LAWS
FLOYD E. GILLIS AND VERNON L. SMITH

Purdue University

its tax base, and gains or losses are not reportable.3
Recognizing that an item given away
rather than sold affects the taxpayer's
revenue, the law has always attempted to
provide some incentive for donations to approved organizations by allowing the donation to be deducted in an amount equal to
the foregonerevenue. The law, however, has
not always appeared to recognize, or at
least to appreciate, the fact that the item is
already deductible at cost by virtue of having been produced. Indeed, it is not until
1948 that one finds specific recognition of
the fact that gifts affect costs as well as
taxable revenues. Prior to 1948, presumably, the shrewd firm deducted the fair
market value from computed net profits in
the determinationof taxable income and deducted total costs (not excluding the costs
of the articles given away) from gross
revenues in the determinationof net profits.
There was no ruling to prohibit the deduction of the gift twice: once as a contribution,
once as an ordinary cost of production!
There are two possible interpretations of
this absence of law. Charitably, one might
argue that perhaps no taxpayer had been
bold enough to claim the double deduction,
and therefore no ruling or case was neces-

I. INTRODUCTION
IN

TIlS

note classical tools are used to ex-

amine the treatment of "gifts in kind" under the federal income-tax laws as they were
but a few years ago, as they are today, and as
they should be, given the objective that the
law appears to be trying to achieve. It will
be demonstrated that, under certain conditions, firms today can maximize profit after
taxes by producing some output to be given
to acceptable charities.
II. THE LAW

Just as cash gifts to approved charities
and educational institutions are deductible
from gross income in the determination of
taxable income, so are gifts made in kind.1
When such gifts in kind are made, they are
deductible at "fair market value," a term
which could have a variety of meanings. In
this paper it will mean the price at which
the firm or individual could sell the gift in
its most conservative market. This construction can be and has been put on the
meaning of the term,2 and, since it is the
most favorable to the taxpayer, it is presumably the pertinent one. If the property
is a capital good, rather than an inventory
item, or if the return is that of an individual
rather than a firm, the gift item is still deductible at fair market value regardless of

3 Federal Tax Service, 1948 (New York: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1948), II, 12, 710.

1 The basic law discussed in this paper is found in
secs. 23(o) and 23(q) of the Internal Revenue Code.
We have relied heavily upon the Prentice-Hlall Tax
Service, 1944 through 1956. Gifts of services are not
deductible.
2 See the Old Mission Valley Portland Cement
Co. case as reported in the Prentice-Hall Tax Service, Sec. 12,827, and Revenue Ruling 55-138. Detailed analysis of all possible meanings of the term is
beyond the scope of this paper.

4This ruling (see Prentice-Hall Tax Service,
1948), based on the Supreme Court case, Helvering v.
Paul R. G. Horst (311 U.S. 112), held that "expenses
of production

are deductible

. . . as ordinary

and

necessary business expenses." Here the taxpayer
was required to include the fair market value of the
product in gross revenue and deduct it again in the
computation of taxable income. This is a more severe
treatment than that of the Old Mission Valley Portland Cement Co. case analyzed below.
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sary. Another construction is that, in the
routine of auditing returns and verifying
whether or not the gift was to a bona fide
recipient, no notice was taken of the cost
figures at all.
Our first task, then, will be to analyze, in
Section ITI, rational behavior of the firm
where a double deduction is allowed for
product donations.
Two rules govern the current treatment
of such donations. In Revenue Ruling 551385 one finds the following:
The fair market value of agricultural or
manufactured products or property held for
sale in the ordinary course of business which is
contributed . . . is not includable in the gross
income of the donor for Federal Income Tax
purposes.... The fair market value which
may be deducted from gross income . . . will be
the replacement cost to the donor in his most
favorable market. There must be an adjustment
to inventory effecting the removal of the donated article and the costs pertaining thereto
... in order to avoid a double deduction.6
Here the fair market value is defined as "the
replacement cost to the donor in his most
favorable market." A more specific description of the treatment of deductions for gifts
in kind is found in the Old Mission Valley
Portland Cement Company case.7 In this
case the taxpayer included the fair market
value of the gift (which seems to have been
its regular selling price) as a part of gross
revenue, deducted it in the determination
of taxable income, and included its costs of
production in its ordinary expenses. The
courts ruled that the taxpayer could also
deduct the gross profit arising from inclusion
of the gift in revenues, gross profits being
the difference between actual cost and fair
market value. the inclusion in revenues is
canceled by the deduction from profits,
thereby washing out, and the true deduction
is cost plus gross profits, or selling price.
Our second task, in Section IV, will be an
analysis of rational behavior when the firm
5 Internal Revenue Bulletin 1955-11.
6 Ibid.
7

Prentice-Hall Tax Service, 1954, Sec. 12,827.
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must exclude costs involved in a donation
but can deduct it at selling price. Since it

can be shown that even the present modified
law yields an actual profit on product donations under certain conditions, and in such
instances it is far preferable to give away
goods than to giv e away money, certain
questions arise about what the law should
be.
Our final task, then, will be an analysis
of what the law should be if its intent is to
treat gifts in kind in the same way as cash
gifts.
III.

OPTIMAL PRODUCT DONATIONS BY
FIRMS UNDER DOUBLE
DEDUCTIBILITY

The analysis of this section applies to the
case in which a firm deducts from its profits
before taxes both the market value of units
of product donated to qualified charitable
institutions and the costs of producing them.
The argument, therefore, has had no practical application since the Internal Revenue
Department felt obliged in its 1955 ruling to
disallow any (Iouble-deductibility interpretation of the original Internal Revenue
Code of 1939.
a) TITE THEORY OF TiHE FIRM UNDER
TH-E TAX LAW

Wredirect our attention first to the nonincorporated firm operating unrler pure
competition and taxed under the individual
income tax law. Let z be the total production
of the frm, x be the quantity of product that
the firm sells on the open market, and y be
the quantity of product donated to some
qualified charitable organization (that is,
= x + y). Suppose
the firm sells its
product for a price p and produces at a
short-run total cost given by the function
C(S), where the latter is convex from below
beyond some level of production. Let the
tax function faced by the firm be i[0], where
0 is the firm's taxable income; that is, gross
income minus all deductio-ns and exemptions. Under the provisions of the tax law,
if K is the total dollar amount of all the
firm's exemptions and deductions that are
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constant (independent of production and first, adjust total ouput to a level x=
donations), and if the donation, y, is de- such that
ductible at both its cost and its market
p=MC(z0),
(3)
value, then
the usual conditions for an optimum; and,
-py-K
6=px-C(z)
second, adjust the quantity of output given
=pz-C(z)
-2py-K.
away to a level y= y, such that
In equation (1) px is the firm's gross
receipts, while px - C(z) is the firm's
"profit (or loss) from business" as it is
termed on Form 1040 of the Individual Income Tax Return. The latter sum would
also be "adjusted gross income" if the proprietor earned no wages or income from
other sources such as dividends and interest. The quantity Py would be the firm's deductions because of donations in the form of
product. Note in equation (1) that, for
every unit given away rather than sold, taxable income decreases by 2p dollars.
In line with the postulates of pure competition, it will be assumed that the quantity
y which is given away has no effect on the
market price of the product or on the
amount the firm can sell at that price.
Profits, net of income taxes, can therefore
be written as
r=px-C(z)

-T[6]

T' [pz-C(zO)

-2py0-K]

-a

.

(4)

The latter condition asserts that, given zo as
determined from (3), units are given away
until the marginal tax rate falls to 2, or until
the firm is operating in the 50 per cent income-tax bracket. This condition may be
derived verbally as follows: For each unit
that is given away rather than sold, the loss
due to failure to sell is -p. On the other
hand, the gain is given by the marginal tax
rate multiplied by the amount by which
taxable income declines. But taxable income
declines p due to the loss in sales and another p because the value of the unit is deductible when donated. Hence the total
gain from donating a unit rather than
selling it is -p + T' {2p}, and units will
be given away until this marginal gain is
zero; that is, -p + T' {2p} = 0 or
= 1
T' -2.

There are two boundary conditions on
the
solution in addition to these marginal
(2)
=pz-Py-C(z)
conditions. The first stems from the fact
-2py-K].
-T[pz-C(z)
that, if the firm is operating in an incometax bracket less than or equal to 50 per cent,
Under the present progressive income tax the firm cannot improve its position by givT[6] is convex from below, and
ing away part of its output. The second
boundary condition grows out of a further
/dT
T=
d 6< 1 .
provision of the income-tax law, namely,
that, "in general, the deduction for conThe necessary conditions for the maxi- tributions may not exceed 20 percent of
your adjusted gross income....
However,
mization of profits in (2) are
you may increase this limitation to 30 percent if the extra 10 percent consists of cona = P -a(z)
aC ( z)
T' .p
0
tributions made to churches, a convention
or association of churches, tax-exempt educational institutions, tax-exempt hospitals,
ay
ay=-t-T'
or certain medical researchorganizations."'
where aC(z)1az is simply marginal cost, This provision places an upper bound, y, on
AIC(z). Hence the conditions for profit
8 Federal Tax Regulations, 1957, U-8, Code (St.
maximizationunder the income-tax law are, Paul: West Publishing Co., 1958), p. 5.
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the quantity of output that can be given
away. Hence
? < yO?<

where
yp=0.30

[pz0-p

-C(z0)]

(5)

away an almost indefinite number of shoes
to the Belgians.9
Suppose our firm finds that it can sell x
units at the established price p. Using the
same notation as before, the problem is to
maximize

or

(6)
0.1-3)[?-C

(pZ)]

-T

paX-C(X-d-y)

-py-K]

with respect to y. Setting or ay

=

0 gives

From this analysis we can conclude that,
y0, such that
under the double-deductibility interpretation of the income-tax law, if a firm pro- T'I[Px-C (x -+ y0) -py0-KI
duced a form of property which it was
(7)
MC(x+y0)
feasible to donate to charitable institutions,
MC(x+yo) +P
then profit maximization required the proprietor of that firm to adjust sales to a level This condition states that units should be
that would just place him in the 50 per cent given away until the marginal tax rate falls
income-tax bracket. The one exception to to the ratio of marginal cost to marginal
this would arise where the firm's donations cost plus price. The condition can be dein the form of product were as much as 30 rived verbally as follows: For each addiper cent of "adjusted gross income."
tional unit produced for donation, the cost
5)

THE CASE OF INDEPEN.DENCE

BETWEEN

SALES AND DONATIONS

Dynamic considerations, uncertainty, ignoranceof the complete cost function, or the
failure to use marginal principles in priceoutput determination may render the preceding approach impractical for decisionmaking. For example, the firm may have a
fixed-pricepolicy because of fear of retaliation, "spoiling the market," or other considerations and may proceed to sell all that
the market will absorb at that price. Under
these conditions, can the firm improve its
position by producing output purely for
donation purposes and deducting the value
of such donations from its taxable income?
The answer is "Yes."
To simplify the analysis, we shall assume
that the donation is to a non-competing
market such as a charity which is not itself a
customer of the firm in question or one that
will distribute the donation exclusively to
markets in which the firm cannot compete.
An example of this latter case would arise if
a shoe manufacturerwho could not seriously
considerselling shoes in Belgium gave shoes
to CARE; this organization could give

incurred is MIC. The marginal return on a
unit given away is the marginal tax rate
multiplied by the decrease in taxable income. But taxable income declines MC dollars because of the deductibility of the cost
of producing the item, and p dollars because
of the deductibility of the item at its market
value. Therefore the marginal net return on
{ +
a unit produced for donation is T {MC
p } - AIC, and units will be given away until this marginal gain is zero; that is,

1"*MIC+ p }-

C = 0 or T' =Mc +
P.

Note in equation (7) that, if p > MC,
then

MC
MC+p

1
2'

and, in equilibrium, the marginal tax rate is
less than 2. Consequently, a firm whose
price was greater than its marginal cost
could benefit from donations even if it fell in
an incomne-taxbracket of less than 2I One of the
advantages offered by CARE as a
dumping market is the fact that this organization
allows the donor to specify the country to which the
gift is to be sent.
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If the firm's best estimate of total cost is
a linear estimate similar to those used in
break-even chart analysis, then marginal
cost is constant; and, if we express marginal
cost as a proportionof price, say Ml1C= 3p,
then the condition (7) becomes

T' [px - C (x) - p (1 + ) y - K]
:
-

Hi or T'[0-

(1?f3)py']

(8)

The expression 0 =
-C(s)-K
would
be the firm's taxable income if it produced
no output for donation purposes.
C) EXTENSION

fixed by the requirement that the corporation cannot donate more than 5 per cent of
its taxable income.
If marginal cost is constant, as in breakeven chart analysis, then we can write
l11C= jp, and for this case we have a
'corner")solution in which, if it pays to give
away at all, it pays to give away the maximum amount allowable under the law. Indeed, if the parameter : < 1.083, it pays to
give away up to the full 5 per cent upper
bound, that is, until
py = 0.05*

px-C

(x) - Spy}

= 0.05* { - opp}
or

TO THE CORPORATION

(11)
Py= 0.05,
The analysis of optimal product donation
Pl?0.03-f3.
policy for the corporation is especially
simple in view of the flat 52 per cent tax on
IV. OPTIMAL PRODUCT DONATIONTS BY
corporation earnings over $25,000. In this
FIRMS UNDER DEDUCTIBILITY AT
case the tax function is simply T[0] = 16 =
MARIKT VALUE ONLY
0.520. In the general case of a non-linear
Since the 1955 ruling, in which the
cost function C(I + y), and, where sales
Bureau of Internal Revenue clearly recogand donations are independent, equation (6)
nized that the tax law did not prohibit
for the corporationbecomes
double deduction of donations in kind, the
r= Px-C(+?y)
application of the law has allowed the firm
to deduct such donations at market value
-t {p5x-C(.+y)
-PY
only. XWhathas not been recognized is that,
in which we have set K equal to 0, since the under this interpretation, both the corpoexemption provisions of the individual in- rate and the non-corporateenterprise,under
come-tax law do not apply to the corpora- conditions likely to prevail in practice, can
tion. Maximizing (9) with respect to y gives still increase profits after taxes by making
product donations. The new ruling reduces
the condition,
the magnitude of the profits to be so gained
0.5 2
ip
still does not place product donations
but
Mc Ox+ Y) = 1 t 0I4-8
(0
P
on a par with cash donations, which clearly
(10)
do not yield the donor a net gain. The reason
= 1.083p.
for this is simply that, under the present
Therefore product donations should be ad- law, a separate give-away market is created
for firms with excess capacity, and, under
justed until marginal cost equals 1.083p.
which are still fairly weak, it pays
conditions
Just as in the analysis of the non-incorfor "sale" in this market.
to
produce
porated firm, there are two boundary conditions on the solution. The lower bound is dea) THE THEORY OF THE FIRM UNDER
termined by the condition that the 52 per
THE 1955 RULING
cent tax rate applies only to corporations
The first important area in which the new
earning a net income in excess of $25,000.
The second (upper) boundary condition is ruling delimits the range of application of
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the law is for the firm in pure competition. where 0 = p- C() - K would be the
Under pure competition no gains can accrue firm's taxable income exclusive of deducto the firm, regardless of its income-tax tions for product donations. Using equation
bracket, from product donations deductible (8') and the income-tax tables, it is possible
at market price, since, by hypothesis, the to map the relationship between 0 and the
firm can sell unlimited quantities at the optimal dollar value of output donations,
pyo, for various values of 3.10To construct
going market price.
This can be seen mathematically by such a map for any given A, we simply set
observing that equation (1) now becomes
0 - pyo equal to the income level corresponding to a tax bracket of 13and solve
for py/. If 0*(A) is the income level at which
0=px-C(x)
-py-K,
(1')
the tax bracket is 1003 per cent, then
in which the costs of producing y cannot be
pyO= Q0* (/)
(8a)
deducted from gross income in arriving at
taxable income. Equation (2) then becomes
gives optimal product value donations as a
function of taxable income 0. Of course, py0
-C(z)
wPr z-py
zero if 0 < 0*(O). The upper bound on
is
(2')
-T [p z-C ( z-y) -2py-K]
.
yOis y, such that Py = 0.30{0 + K - py}
or
Maximizing, we get the same conditions in
(8'b)
py = 0?+K
(3); that is, MC(z0) = p, but condition (4)
py3.33?13.
becomes T' = 1, and there exists no positive
solution for y0.
A decision map for optimal donations
under the 1955 ruling is shown in Figure 1,
b) INDEPENDENCE BETWEEN
the computation for which was carried out
SALES AND DONATIONS
by applying equations (8'a) and (8'b) to an
Under the new ruling, equation (6) be- unmarried taxpayer with K = $600. As an
illustration of the use of this diagram, concomes
sider a firm whose marginal cost is constant
at 65 per cent of its selling price. We see that
r=Pi--C(X+y)
(6')
for A = 0.65 such a firm would have to earn
- T [p.~- C (x)
-y K] .
a taxable income of $32,000 before product
donations could be made without incurring
=
Now setting Erh/ay 0 gives y0, such that a net loss in income after taxes. For taxable
income in excess of $32,000, the 1 = 0.65
contour allows one to read off the value of
T' [px - C (x) - py?- K]
product donations that will maximize in(7')
MCG(+y0)
come after taxes. At a taxable income of
_p
about $43,500 a "kink" occurs in the contour, since for incomes above this value the
According to this condition, if p > ARC, 30 per cent limit on donations determines
then T' < 1. Therefore, a positive solution the optimal product donation.
Suppose, under these conditions, that a
for yo requires price to be greater than
marginal cost. Condition (7') is clearly
10Computing 0 would cause no difficulties beyond
stronger than (7).
those normally encountered in filing income-tax reIf marginal cost is constant, and we set turns. The parameter if = MC/p is also completely
MC = Op, then the condition (7') becomes operational in that it requires nothing more sophisT,'[I-py]

I=[

(8"s

ticated than a break-even chart for the firm's operations.
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firm has a reportable income of $40,000
and gives nothing away. From the income
tax table for an unmarried taxpayer its tax
is as follows:
Tax on the first $32,000............
$14,460
Tax of 65 per cent on the next $6,000 3,900
Tax of 69 per cent on the next $2,000 1,380
Total .......................

$19,740

Taxable profits ....................
$40,000
Cost of contribution ......
. $ 5, 200
Tax on $32,000 reportable income ...................
$14,460
Total, tax plus contribution.....
Profit after taxes..............

19,660
$20,340

The firm has bettered itself-ignoring good
will-by $80 through a product donation

40-

z

36-

o
0 <
j28

,-

0

24

u-

0
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20-
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0
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40

60
80
1010
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140
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160

decision map for optimal product donations by firms under the income tax

and profit after taxes is $20,260. To demon- valued at $8,000.
strate that the firm betters itself, assume
The analysis of Section IV on the corpooptimal donations with a fair market value ration applies, with minor alterations, to the
of $8,000 (see Fig. 1) at a cost (I3= 0.65) of corporate case under the 1955 ruling. For
$5,200."
example, under deductibility at market
value only, equation (10) becomes MC=
11The readerwill note that the samenet profitis
obtainedby gifts of $2,000or any amount between 0.52p.
$2,000 and $8,000. This zone of indifferenceoccurs
V. CAN CASH AND PRODUCT DONATIONS
wheneverf3equalsthe marginaltax rate, becauseof
BE GIVEN EQUAL TREATMENT?
the discontinuitiesin the income-taxfunction.Figure 1 has beenconstructedfor valuesof j3coinciding
Clearly, allowing deductions for cash
with actual tax-bracketpercentagesand assumes
that the firm gives away output until the lower gifts made to acceptable organizations is a
direct inducement extended to taxpayers to
boundof the relevanttax bracketis reached.
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absence of a double deduction, there must be
many corporationswith excess capacity that
will not lowerprices to increasesales because
of the nature of their demand curve or because of some fear of spoiling the market
and whose marginal costs are less than 52
per cent of their selling price. Rationally,
they should find some acceptable institution (not constituting part of their usual
market) and give more in order to make
more. The conditions are even more favorable for the unincorporated entrepreneur
who is in a higher marginal tax bracket than
the corporation. One can imagine a firm
changing its fiscal year so that the last
month will be the slackest, estimating revenues and taxes in order to decide rationally
how much activity yields them the largest
net profit, and budgeting product donations
along with sales.
Since neither of us pretends to be a student of tax rulings, it is suggested that
many more-perhaps more important-provisions of the law might be fruitfully exr= pX-C(?+y)
posed to similar analysis. One is the de(12)
ductibility of disasters: What is the true
- T [px~- Cx+ y) ]
cost of insurance for a man in the 80 per
cent tax bracket when, if his house burns
and the firm could not make product donadown, he can deduct 100 per cent of the
tions without reducing profit after taxes.
uninsured loss?"2 His premiums yield a
Indeed, it would make no difference to the
marginal protection of only 20 per cent of
firm whether it donated $1,000 cash or units
the value of the house.
of product that cost $1,000 to produce.
12 This problem could be analyzed by application
It is difficult to understand why this rulapparatus discussed in Milton Friedman and
of
the
ing was not handed down at the very

encourage such gifts. In effect, the government pays a portion of the cost of such gifts,
a percentage equal to the tax rate; one
would suspect that the intention in extending such inducements to donations other
than cash is to subsidize them to the same
extent. There seems to be little reason why
Congress would view product donations as
either more or less socially desirable than
cash gifts. This raises the question: Just how
should the tax law be stated if product
donations are to be put on a par with cash
gifts?
As it turns out, under both the individual
and the corporate income tax, there is a
simple general ruling that will make all
firms indifferentbetween product donations
and cash donations. Such a ruling is simply
to allow the firm to compute taxable income
by deducting from gross receipts the total
cost of producing both the units sold and
any units that are donated. Under such a
ruling, profit would be given by

beginning.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

WVesuggest that the preceding analysis
has far-reaching implications. Even in the

L. J. Savage, "The Utility Analysis of Choices Involving Risk," Journal of Political Economy, Vol.
LVI, No. 4 (August, 1948). It is interesting that the
authors of this article called attention to the importance of the deductibility of uninsured losses (see n.
16, p. 285, and n. 32, p. 295) in applying utility theory to insurance choice.
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